All Pentagon procurement projects labeled as a “Major Defense Acquisition Pro829XX385grammar849XEx385” (MDAP) “are subject to the requirement of Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) in Title 10 of the United States Code (USC).The B-21 Raider is An example of a pro829XX385grammar that LRIP was created after The Post-World War II run of large-scale weapons development and production programs, with specialized aircraft such as The Air Force One.
The Defense Acquisition Encyclopedia is also known as “AcqNotes”. Covers all areas of Pentagon Weapons Procurement Progra829XX385manuscript.
Aeronautical research and development has been carried out at a breakneck pace since the advent of aircraft in military service following WWI, and it has not been inexpensive.The United States is The leading country in aeronautical research and development, particularly in entomology.
Military Aircraft accounts For More Than Half Of US Defense Acquisitions costs, totaling $ 553 billion.
Aircraft acquisition is The primary focus of The DoD’s spending, with only a few significant ground combat programs available.
1. How LRIP is Related to Other Parts in the Acquisition Process?.
LRIP is the most risky acquisition phase for both Northrop-Grumman and the Air Force.
Prior to Low Rate Initial Production, there are three crucial steps in The MDAP Acquisition Process that must be followed.The B-21 Raider program was In operation from the time of contract signing to the launch of LRIP, which lasted for 12 years.
The program is being managed without the Pentagon’s usual contracting infrastructure To simplify things.Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office (AFRCO) at Wright-Patterson AFB in Dayton, OH was designated to administer The program.The headquarters of the AFRCO’s parent organization, the Air Force Systems Command (ASR), is situated at WPAFB.
The Air Force Research Command Office (AFRCO) has the authority to cancel a program before It begins LRIP, which may be painful.
The Pentagon contracted for the R&D of numerous aircranes during the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. The government initially paid for all development costs.The Pentagon, defense contractors, and Congress were all aware that The creation of new technology was a time-consuming and expensive endeavor.
The contracting process for Pentagon weapon systems was based on the belief that individuals from various backgrounds must bear the cost of creating new weapons.
“Non-Recurring Engineering” (NRE) costs became a common term in all types of manufacturing due to This.The term NRE denotes a customer’s intention to purchase an inherently existing or counterfeit product or service, but also acknowledges the need for modifications.Additional funding for developmental engineering will be required by The contractor.
NRE is commonly included as a separate contract line item for the extra engineering funding.NRE costs could be a small sum of money to accommodate suppositions of customers wanting minor changes to the seller’s standard product, or billions for something like the B-21 Raider.
The cost of NRE development is borne by Customers.The use of NRE line items on a contract is attractive to customers because it eliminates hidden costs from the per-unit sales price.
The Pentagon’s decision to spend billions of dollars on defense contractor research and development in the mid-1960s led to concerns among contracting officials about potential cost overruns.
The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) was created by The Defense Department in 1965 to oversee financial audits of MDAP contracts.
In response to The DCAA’s actions, Pentagon contracting officers restructured their acquisition process to prevent contractors from overpricing for their services.
Under The new fixed-price method, The defense contractor was obligated to bear The cost overrun unless it could prove that The situation was caused by an event not anticipated by either The contractor or The Pentagon.
The milestone/funding contract model was utilized by LRIP, a new tool.The contracting model can be characterized as a “pay-what-you-go approach” by the general public.
The quote about discovering new technology is fitting for this discussion::.
“You’re uncertain about what you’ll never understand.
The development of weapons with outdated technology is not a fault in the Congress or the Pentagon, as demonstrated by testing and error in an R&D program.The team is aware of the ineffective research and development efforts that ultimately fail, despite spending Money on them.
After the Apollo Space Program was terminated and the Vietnam War ended in 1973, there was a significant decrease in government contracting for the defense/aerospace sector.The emergence of new contracts at the end of the decade resulted in the use of various contractual methods to control rampant program expenses and excessive delays.
Related.
The B-21 Raider is characterized by 5 Key attributes That distinguish it From The B-2 Spirit.
The B-21 Raider has a similar appearance, but it differs in several ways from its predecessor, the B-2 Spirit.
The implementation of Low Rate Initial Production was done to prevent the Government customer or the contractor from overestimating certain contract objectives, while lagging behind in other areas.
Government contracting officers and program managers fiercely resist the temptation to take shortcuts.The contracting cycle involves The use of incremental tools or phases to ensure programs are delivered on schedule and within budget.The MDAP may incorporate some or all of the Tools (phases) mentioned below, Depending on the type of project.
All three contracting tools were employed in The B-21 Program before LRIP.
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The focus of these Contract Management Tools is on aircraft programs. |
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Systems Development and Demonstration (SDD) is a form of software Development. |
When the Pentagon and the contractor are uncertain about the program’s nature and direction, SDD is employed.Flying prototypes, scale models, and mock-ups are all potential means of Demonstrating what has been developed.Additionally, the work output may be uncertain, leading the Pentagon to either extend the SDD or issue a new contra829XX385Court849. |
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Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD). |
Typically, EMD involves the use of two to five test aircraft, with at least one being exclusively used for ground testing.If not already completed in SDD, there are Three crucial milestones in EMD that should be noted: 1.PDR 2: Preliminary Design Review.CDR is the term used to describe the process of conducting Critical Design reviews.The successful CDR leads to the contractor “freezing” the aircraft’s engineering configuration. 3.Construct 4-7 aircraft that are capable of flying and satisfy all contractually required tests. |
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The process of FSD involves the contractor clearing out any remaining items for action and preparing for production.In most cases, This stage is characterized by intense discussions about the program’s ability to support real production and avoid the design engineers overreacting. |
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LRIP stands for Low Rate Initial Production. |
The main objective of LRIP is to “stress test” the contractor’s team and identify any remaining issues that may hinder a typical production run. |
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FSD uses incremental lots as blocks to prevent the contractor from getting too far ahead of schedule. |
2. The B-21 Raider’s LRIP Efforts and their progress in combat.
What is the story behind the program’s creation?.
The purposes of LRIP are::.
- To sell production-configured or representative articles for operational testing);.
- To build a base for initial production of the weapon system and;.
- To facilitate a systematic growth in the production of the weapon system To enable full-scale manufacturing once operational testing is finished. [note: “. Operational testing. “refers to the. Directorate of Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT, E) of the Defense Department. The flight testing that the prime contractor had agreed upon is not included in this.
The B-21 Raider is distinct from any other aircraft acquisition program in recent times.The Air Force and Northrop-Grumman did not want to face the same problems as previous programs such as the F-22 Raptor, B-2 Spirit, F-35 Lightning II, or the KC-46 Pega829XX385Susanna819XY386 (Fact number 4 references issues with these aircraft).
In 2011, Northrop-Grumman, Lockheed-Martin, and Boeing were given a confidential Request for Information (RFI) from the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office (AFRCO), which was not made public.AFRCO granted Top-Secret contracts to The three defense contractors for an SDD effort in The year that followed.
The AFRCO’s appointment as Program Executive was The first sign of a change on The B-21 Pro829XX385grammar.
The traditional, lengthy throughput timing of an aircraft was reduced by implementing classified RFI and SDD contracts.The development process could be shortened by 2-3 years with The implementation of These steps. The AFRCO would still look for practical ways to save time and money.
In 2014, the AFRCO sent an unclassified Request for Proposal to all three contractors After the SDD contracts were awarded.In 2015, Northrop Grumman won the contract based on their proposal and awarded them a contract for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) effort.
Northrop-Grumman was required to produce six planes using The new production line once The B-21 manufacturing tools and equipment were finished, as stated in The SOW of The contract.
Six planes have been constructed, and three of them are airworthy.Different teams are assigned to administer contractually required tests and evaluations.
The LRIP contract was unveiled by AFRCO In November 2023, coinciding with the Raider’s first flight and the intention to smartly progress through the B-21′ ensuing milestones.The B-21’s LRIP contract is distinct in that it necessitates special approval for certain features.
3. The B-21 LRIP Contract is waived by the Program Executive.
A crucial step to keep running the program and keeping costs in check.
The LRIP phase of an MDAP acquisition must not exceed 10 % of the projected total production quantity, as stated in Title 10 (USC) Section 4231.
The MDAP requirement for an SDD contract involves a final agreement between the contractor and contracting officers regarding the number of aircraft to be produced during the lifetime of the B-21 pro.
The B-21 LRIP is estimated to measure 10 aircrackers, with a height of 829 XX385 feet, which makes it challenging to maintain the cost per plane in line with the AFRCO and Northrop-Grumman’s agreement for the first 21 production airframes.
During the B-21 Program, Northrop-Grumman and the Air Force have been exploring ways to execute multiple contractual obligations concurrently rather than working in isolation.The AFRCO is aware of the practice of Doing this.Their charter includes the responsibility of identifying and mitigating roadblocks.
In addition to the statutory LRIP requirement of up to 10 % for the B-21 Program, there was also a problem with MDAP that prevented it from transitioning to Full-Rate Production.
AFRCO and DOT & E confirmed These issues.Instead of waiting for Northrop-Grumman to complete its testing, DOT & E is doing all of that in-house.
The Defense Secretary endorsed Northrop-Grumman, AFRCO, and DOT & E and approved a waiver request sent to The Program Executive.By granting a waiver, The LRIP quantity would be increased from 10 to 21 aircraft.The delivery of The last LRIP lot is scheduled for 2030.
Following the LRIP waiver, AFRCO and Northrop-Grumman reached a deal that fixed prices for 19 additional aircraft to increase total capacity to 40.The Program Executive has increased The LRIP waiver from 21 to 40.
There have never been any previous changes made to the contract process.
4. Northrop-Grumman takes on a Financial hit through LRIP.
It is preferable to charge off 2023 taxes instead of keeping them on the books for a longer period.
From the 1980s to the present day, Pentagon contracting officers have given defense contractors contracts with more stringent cost controls.Although Cost controls were effective, there have been numerous instances where the Pentagon and defense contractor were dissatisfied with the outcome.
The Northrop-Grumman B-2 Spirit, the Boeing-Lockheed F-22 Raptor, and the Lockheed-Martin F-35 Lightning II are among the problematic aircraft development contracts.
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The Overrun of Programs is a consequence of Cost Overruns. |
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The ban on exports comes after Congress slashed production from 132 to 21 aircraft. |
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Congress has imposed a ban on exports while cutting production from 750 to 381 to 187. |
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The First flight took place in December 2006, but the First delivery occurred in 2015.Numerous technical issues existed during The nine-year period between The first flight and delivery, which also triggered heated cost negotiations regarding cost overru829XX385nouns849XEx386 The Pentagon plans to purchase 2,456 planes.The F-35 is set to be purchased by Nine countries through a contract.More than 1,000 planes have been delivered by The program for all countries and models.The Air Force and Lockheed-Martin have come to an agreement to apply extra costs Within the last 3-4 years. |
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A freighter derivative from Boeing’s successful 767 program is The basis for The KC-46.The Air Force has plans to acquire 179 aircrates, and The KC-46 currently has two more customers in addition to The USAF: Japan and Israel.A Firm, Fixed Price per aircraft, and a Fixed amount for program development were The terms of The contract. 9 billion.The Profit margins are extremely low due to Two significant engineering errors that resulted in an additional $ 700 million charge, which Boeing was contractually obligated to absorb.Before the $ 700 million charge, Boeing believed that the 179 planes on order would allow them to break even and earn profits for Japan and Israel with eleven aircraft.It is unlikely that Boeing will make any money At this time. |
The implementation of fixed development costs and fixed unit pricing has resulted in conflicting results for defense contractors.The use of This contracting practice has become problematic for some products, such as the KC-46 and the B-21, due to their high NRE development cost and subsequent production.
If the government and the contractor are in a hurry, there is always an added cost involved.The primary reason for cost overruns is the effort to save significant amounts of money and time by performing contract tasks simultaneously rather than in a sequential manner, as demonstrated by intend829XX385edition.
The following is A suitable demonstration of how NOT to do it. McDonnell–Douglas–Boeing T-45 Goshawk jet trainer. Debacle.
Northrop-Grumman has been a strong advocate for keeping investors informed about the B-21 Program’s progress and challenges, including financial issues.It was expected that they would be charged a pre-tax fee of $ 1 for this aim.In the past, taxpayers were required to pay 56 billion in taxes by 2023.
The Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase of AFRCO’s B-21 Raider Program was awarded to Northrop-Grumman in 2015, along with a contract.EMD paid for The production line and trained technicians to build six aircraft under a single contract.
Northrop was able to submit billing on LRIP work for the Raider in November 2023, after AFRCO had already issued a fixed price agreement During the 2015 period.
The public information was made public by Boeing and Lockheed Martin after the AFRCO announced their award and issued the EMD and LRIP contracts, which were subject to a similar process.
Related.
How do The Rival Stealth Bombers and B-21 Raiders compare in terms of their capabilities?.
The B-21 Raider and China’s H-20 demonstrate contrasting levels of stealth and range, impacting The future strategic airpower of each country.
A protest was filed by competitors of Northrop Grumman with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) without delay.As the Air Force RFP only allowed three defense contractors to respond if they had completed the SDD phase, any award protest could not be based on work that had already been done.
Both Lockheed-Martin and Boeing expressed their dissatisfaction with Northrop Grumman’s “lowball” bid for its firm, fixed-price items, which they believed were necessary due to their painful awareness of the fact that the Air Force only wanted certain bids.
The KC-46 Pegagus Tanker Program was awarded to Boeing in 2011, with a fixed price per aircraft and development costs that could be as high as $ 4 million. 9 billion.Given these numbers, Boeing did not anticipate making a profit until the latter stages of producing the 179 tankers on order.
Flight testing during the EMD phase in 2014 revealed two significant issues: Cobham Aerospace’s aerial refueling system had a serious flaw that was too difficult to address.Due to this, the program was delayed for 19 months.
Flight testing on Cobham’s $ 206 million gaff revealed a significant flaw in the wire harness system of the Boeing-designed aircraft.Triple redundancy was a key feature in The design of all major systems, including The KC-46.Multiple systems, including crosstalk in the wiring harnesses, were found to be excessive signal interference by Flight test engineers.
The problem was discovered during Further ground testing.Rather than designing the wiring harnesses to route redundant wires in three different areas, such as left side, right side and bottom beneath floorboards, all three wire harness designs were built adjacent to each other on one side of the plane.
The wiring problem was resolved with an additional $ 425 million from Boeing.Non-recurring engineering charges amounting to $ 7 billion have been incurred by Boeing for KC-46.The contract was only valid for The initial $ 4 amount. 9 billion.Only a fraction of The $ 2 billion in new funding has been allocated to The Air Force. 1 billion.
5. What Are the potential difficulties that may arise for LRIP?.
Both Northrop-Grumman and The Air Force are acutely aware of The high stakes throughout LRIP.
The B-21 Program’s serious challenges are acknowledged by All parties, with three major issues being referred to as roadblocks:.
- Dealing with the significant B-21 subcontractor obligations.
- Preventing future cost control dilemmas.
- Predicting and preparing for future challenges to sustain program momentum.
Dealing with the significant B-21 subcontractor obligations.
The B-21 Program comprises of seven significant subcontractors::.
- Pratt & Whitney.
- Janicki Industries.
- BAE Systems.
- Spirit AeroSystems.
- Orbital ATK.
- Rockwell-Collins.
- GKN Aerospace.
Additionally, There are over 400 smaller suppliers.Northrop-Grumman has been in close contact with The company’s seven major suppliers and numerous smaller suppliers for many years.The importance of seven suppliers is evident on all American military aircraft, and Each supplier is crucial to The success of other aircraft manufacturers.
The B-21 Program poses a danger to all, including The Air Force, Northrop-Grumman, and The seven critical suppliers.The B-21’s suppliers could face serious consequences If Northrop-Grumman fails miserably.
A $ 1 deal from Northrop-Grumman is a significant one.Northrop-Grumman would likely have to take on the liability for revenue loss or a major program delay if any critical supplier is unable to absorb the impact of the 56 billion write-off.
To counter inflationary pressures, Northrop-Grumman has withdrawn $ 60 million more from AFRCO over the last several years.Considering the expenses that were written on paper and the importance of Cost controls during LRIPs, This is a meager sum.
The KC-46 program’s lengthy flight testing period was a significant moment for Boeing, as it took over four years to complete.The target was a variation of the B767-200 Freighter, which had been in service for more than two decades.FedEx ordered 50 new B767-200s immediately after the Air Force completed the KC-46 deal with Boeing.Each of FedEx’s aircraft was steered on the same production line as the KC-46, with each plane being rotated between 829 and 828 by heraldry.
How much time would It take to test an all-new F-35 with Lockheed-Martin during its 11-year testing period?.The Air Force declared that it had developed The most extensive flight testing program in aviation history.
During the 2014 B-21 Request for Proposal period, Lockheed-Martin and Boeing executives alerted Northrop-Grumman about the drawbacks of bidding a fixed price for the development of upcoming aircraft.
Due to Northrop-Grumman’s belief that they had thoroughly evaluated their costs and backed the fixed price proposal offered, the company did not take the advice.Northrop Grumman’s B-21 bid was deemed fair and reasonable by Both the AFRCO and the General Accountability Office.The two competitors ‘protest was dismissed by The GAO.
The first 40 aircraft controlling costs have been fixed priced by AFRCO and Northrop-Grumman, making it a crucial point of agreement.Northrop-Grumman will not be sympathetic towards cost overruns in the supply chain as suppliers of the B-21 have been locked into rigid pricing structures.Northrop-Grumman will not receive favorable treatment from AFRCO if they request pricing relief.
Kathy Warden, the CEO of Northrop Grumman, stated earlier this year that company leadership comprehended the pitfalls of firm, fixed-price contracts for developmental aircrackers.
Warden announced that Northrop-Grumman would be able to profit from the Full-Rate Production of the final 60 aircrates, with the agreed upon pricing for the 40th aircraft.The program’s size may be raised by the AFRCO from 100 to 134 or more aircraft.
Amplification of the B-21’s LRIP Situation.
Working on significant contractual obligations in parallel instead of serially is a risky move that can be fatal, As demonstrated by Boeing and Lockheed-Martin.
Finding flaws and correcting them through design changes or manufacturing processes is One of the primary objectives of completing flight testing before full-rate production.
Two options are available for correcting any problems that are identified and found:.
- Using them alongside suppliers and/or in-house manufacturing.
- Evaluate the potential use of contaminated parts and equipment that have already been manufactured, and then proceed with operations.
The MDAP regulations restrict LRIP to a maximum of 10% of the total expected, and the program cannot proceed with it until flight testing is completed.
The LRIP phase of The B-21 Program is now expected to consist of 40 aircraft.Flight testing can reveal significant issues that could have implications for costs, production timeframes, and flight test completion.There is no room for error, and there is a high level of risk involved.The te829XX385lines will Only be recorded in time.
Related.
B-21 Vs.What distinguishes B-52H’s Raider from its Stratofortress counterpart?.
The USAF’s bomber fleet will be anchored by These two planes for an extended period.